Why Kyrgyzstan matters...

Well, it doesn't that much, sorry to say. Kyrgyzstan has been a kicking ball between Russia, USA and China as of late. Following independence in 1991 under the leadership of Askar Akayev, Kyrgyzstan was fast becoming an anomaly in Central Asia - an properly functioning democracy with comparatively low levels of corruption. Without the mass reserves of natural resources which neighbours Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan possess, and extremely isolated by virtue of being at the centre of the Eurasian land mass, Kyrgyzstan was at the liberty of outside forces. Akayev's rule by the turn of the century supposedly started to display the same totalitarian traits already witnessed in its neighbours, whereby his son and daughter were elected into parliament, light measures against opposition media and politicians applied and corruption growing (but not at Uzbek levels). However, when Akayev was toppled in 2005 in the popular but violent 'Tulip Revolution', I didn't buy it. On a regional basis, Akayev was the most transparent of Central Asia's leaders, his children were genuinely (and still are) interested in politics, which is unlike, for example, Uzbekistan president's daughter Gulnara Karimova (more about her another time), and Kyrgyzstan served as a model of democratisation for the region. Nonetheless, that's what Kyrgyzstan was to serve as - a model. In other words, the 'Great Game' of the 19th century between the world's then superpowers was now being played out again. The 'Tulip Revolution' was definitely a win for the USA for control of the region, to guarantee access for US troops to Afghanistan (a problem since the Uzbeks forced them out previously), but most of all to act as a sign to the dictators of the region that if they don't watch out, the USA could organise similar 'revolutions' in their country. So with trumped up justifications of corruption and threatening democracy, the Western media swallowed the USA line in full that this 'Tulip Revolution' was the culmination of long-held public discontent with the Akayev government.

Apparently, the 'Tulip Revolution' was supposed to usher in a new era of democracy not just for Kyrgyzstan but for the region. That was the initial superficial image provided while attention was still focused on the country. However, as soon as the West felt content that good had been done and turned its attention away, the new government under Kurmanbek Bakiyev quickly became even more authoritarian and corrupt than the supposed authoritarian and corrupt Akayev government it swept away. But... noone in the West cared because he was 'our' guy and the Manas airfield was being used as a way station for US forces in Afghanistan. Bakiyev, knowning very well that Kyrgyzstan had nothing to offer except Manas to the Americans, then pitted Russia, China and the USA against each other in a successful effort to extract as much aid from them as possible. Unfortunately for the Kyrgyzstanis, their lot did not improve as promised, instead things became worse than before. Added with the Central Asian tendency for nepotism, regional and tribal loyalties and political patronage, Bakiyev was rewarding his power base of ethnic Kyrgyz in the southern city of Jalalabad while the rest of the country was suffering.

Before going on, some background. The Kyrgyz as a nation, like other Central Asian peoples, didn't exist until the 1920s when Stalin, who was Commissar for Nationalities at the time, decided that the Turkic and Persian speaking peoples of Soviet Central Asia would need to be organised into separate nations. A classic case of divide and rule, what distinguished the Kyrgyz were that they were Turkic-speaking mountain nomads, as opposed to the Turkic-speaking settled Uzbeks or plains nomadic Kazakhs. At first, the Kyrgyz were known as Kara-Kyrgyz (Black Kyrgyz) as the Kyrgyz title was given to the Kazakhs so that they could be distinguished from the Russian Cossacks (Kazaks in Russian). The differences between Kyrgyz, Kazakh and Uzbek today are extremely slight, reflecting the pre-1920s ethnic situation in Central Asia when all Turkic-speakers saw themselves as Turks. To add to the mix, the borders of the new Soviet Central Asian republics were drawn haphazardly, supposedly to reflect these ethnic divisions by some accounts, or to ensure that each republic is interdependent by others. As the Soviet Union effectively operated as the one country out of Moscow, these borders meant nothing during Soviet times, but only posed a major problem once the USSR collapsed in 1991. This explains why the southern part of Kyrgyzstan is much better connected to Uzbekistan and Tajikistan than to its capital Bishkek, or that the railway line from Almaty in Kazakhstan to Tashkent in Uzbekistan now criss-crosses the Kazakh-Kyrgyz border at many locations. Likewise, many ethnic groups lived outside of their nominal republics, hence why Uzbeks form a substantial minority in southern Kyrgyzstan.

There has never been a history of animosity between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks as they are essentially the same people who were only divided a little less than 100 years ago. With this in mind, when violence erupted in Osh, southern Kyrgyzstan between Uzbeks and Kyrgyz, noone could believe what was happening. 200 people died in violent clashes in June 1990, caused by disputes over water and land. However, as soon as independence was declared the following year, there was no further violence. This has led many to believe that the violence was orchestrated by local Communist Party officials, with help from the Soviet Army, desperate to cling on to power by instigating the clashes and ramming down the message that collapse of the Communist Party apparatus and of the USSR as a whole would lead to ethnic violence and war. Fortunately, and predictably, that did not eventuate.

So why has there been violence again, now in 2010? The best explanation I have read is that this violence, which the Western media have been quick to jump to clichés by erroneously labelling as 'historical animosity', has been led and conducted by local organised criminal groups, in particular heroin drug-running operations, intent on keeping their power over the region and creating an atmosphere of instability - the perfect environment for organised crime to operate. Rumours of one ethnic group receiving favourable treatment, especially when there's high unemployment, plus a mass return of male workers from Russia and Kazakhstan, resulting in a whole mass of males with no purpose in life and without the means to financially support families and fulfil their male role as providers, fuels their need to emasculate themselves somehow and, in turn, makes for fertile ground for violence. This has been a pattern witnessed in many other flashpoints, whether it be Bosnia, Macedonia, Sri Lanka, Congo ... you name it.

The interim president of Kyrgyzstan, Roza Otunbayeva, was right in pushing ahead with the referendum for changing from a presidential to parliamentary system. The intial results indicate an overwhelming majority have voted for this significant change, which brings hope to the region so characteristically ruled by larger than life presidents with growing personality cults. Kyrgyzstan's hope now is that this change will bring benefits to all of its citizens and hopefully without any negative inteference from its neighbours and foreign powers.